How to Win a Specific Performance Lawsuit

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Real property is unique in the eyes of the court, therefore, specific performance typically arises in these types of transactions. Specific performance is asking the court to force the opposing party into a contract that obligates them to honor the contract at issue, rather than awarding money damages. For example, a buyer can force a reluctant seller to perform the purchase sale agreement.

 

 

These are the requirements for the lawsuit:

  • Terms must be certain: Essential factors include identifying: (1) the seller, (2) the buyer, (3) the price to be paid, (4) the time and manner of payment, and (5) the property to be transferred.
  • The buyer paid adequate consideration and the contract was just.
  • The plaintiff must have performed the agreement.
  • The defendant must have breached the agreement.
  • A money award must be inadequate.

When a party wins a Specific Performance lawsuit, the court will order the sale of the property at the price and terms agreed upon. Moreover, the victorious party will also be entitled to a judgment for the rents and profits from the time he was entitled to the conveyance under the contract.

When a purchase and sale deal starts to go wrong, seek legal advice. While the other party may have breached the agreement, the wrong response (i.e., refusing to perform your obligations) can destroy your chances for success in the lawsuit.

For the full story, please visit: http://www.thenichereport.com/articles/the-5-steps-to-prosecute-a-successful-lawsuit-for-specific-performance/

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Short Sales: Seldom Easy and Often Not What You Expected

A short sale of your home is sometimes your best alternative. But short sales often do not successfully close, and even when they do you must be vigilant to avoid problems later.

In a short sale, a house is sold by “shorting”—underpaying—one or more of the lenders (or “lienholders”), because the value of the house, and thus the purchase price offered by the reasonable buyer, is not enough to pay everyone in full. The liens can include not just voluntary ones such as the first and second mortgage, but also judgments, income taxes, support obligations, unpaid utilities, and property taxes. All lienholders must consent and release their liens, or the sale cannot occur, because the title needs to be clear for the new buyer to be in full ownership.

The important thing to know is that unless you get a full settlement or satisfaction in writing you may face continuing liability to any creditor who was not paid in full, even after the sale!  This is why it is important to work with competent and knowledgeable professionals in dealing with any short sale situation.

The primary benefit of a short sale is that it avoids a foreclosure on the homeowner’s credit record—that is, it does so IF the short sale is successful. Generally, the most common current underwriting criteria will prevent a borrower from qualifying for a new home loan for up to 7 years after a foreclosure, but only 2-4 years after a short sale.  (However, given the present economic climate, in the future there may be less credit record difference between a short sale and a foreclosure.)  This credit record difference is often the primary reason borrowers will try to do a short sale, instead of just letting a property go to foreclosure.

Short sales can have problems, however.

First, they can be much harder to pull off than expected, and can take much longer than expected. It is also possible they fail to close, typically due to servicer/lender rejection of reasonable purchase offers, which can be very frustrating to all parties involved.  Short sales may also fail due to:

  • Lack of incentive of the Servicer:  Many mortgage companies are not well organized or staffed to handle short sale negotiations.  Borrowers and agents generally must work through a servicing company, whose financial incentives may well not encourage short sales. So they may drag their heels, and can even sabotage your efforts, even after months of submitting documents and reasonable offers.  This causes many would-be buyers to get frustrated and walk away from the deal rather than keep trying in the face of such adversity and frustration.  LAck of responsiveness of servicers is a major cause of short sale failures.
  • Since all lienholders must agree, any one of them can kill the deal: To accomplish a short sale, usually the first mortgage holder has to give up some money to a junior lienholder or two. The benefit to the first mortgage holder is that getting a little less out of the sale is better than incurring the substantial costs and delay of foreclosure.  However, they may not be willing to allow enough money to a junior to entice all parties to allow the short sale to be completed.  Everybody wants their “fair share” of a pie that is too small to make everybody happy.  So just when you think you have a deal among the main players , someone else crawls out of the woodwork demanding a payment and jeopardizing the closing. They all have a legal claim against the property, and can delay or undo the whole deal.
  • Closing and other costs can be too high: Sometimes after adding up all the closing costs and realtor fees, there may not be a high enough “net proceed” number to entice the lender to do the deal.  Of course, the realtors and their negotiating agents are doing a lion’s share of the work in any short sale process, and must be adequately compensated by the lender at closing.  This is how a short sale can be done with little or no out-of-pocket cost to the borrower.  Sometimes the banks have a hard time with this concept and will lead to a sale failure by their rejection of reasonable market offers.  This just means they will actually lose more money in the long run, and it is frustrating for everyone involved, particularly the realtors and others who put substantial time and efforts into the process only to have it fail due to a recalcitrant or incompetent servicing agent.

Short sales can be dangerous if you are not well-informed:

  • Potential liability from unpaid balances on the junior mortgages and liens: Although you may be told that you will not be liable, you need to be sure that the acceptance and/or settlement documents and the applicable law in fact cut off any financial liability to you following the sale. Also be aware that sometimes in the midst of the negotiations, especially if a junior lienholder is playing tough, and the closing has been delayed for a long time, you may be feel forced to accept some liability in order for the closing to occur.  This may or may not be in your best interest, and you may wish to consult with an attorney to discuss all the factors and options – be sure to consult with someone who is unbiased and who will advise as to your interests alone (unlike realtor or others who may only get paid upon sale).
  • Potential tax consequences: This issue deserves a whole blog by itself. The key principle is that debt forgiveness can be treated as income subject to taxation unless you fit within one of the exceptions. Make sure you talk with an appropriate tax specialist or attorney about this before investing any time or expectations in the short sale option.  Most residential borrowers will have an exception, but not always!
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Now Say that Mortgage Principal Reductions are Good for BOTH Homeowners AND Taxpayers

Will Fannie and Freddie finally be making mortgage principal reductions now that their own analysis shows that doing so would benefit their own financial health—and make them better able to repay billions owed to U.S. taxpayers?

My last blog described Fannie and Freddie’s conflicting purposes: to make home ownership more accessible, but to do so profitably for themselves. And I showed how this inherent conflict has led to a political dispute between the Obama Administration on one side pushing for greater flexibility in helping distressed homeowners keep their homes—and specifically to allow principal reductions, while on the other side Edward DeMarco, the acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and Fannie and Freddie’s overseer, disallowing principal reductions in order “to preserve and conserve [Fannie and Freddie’s] assets.”

Helping Homeowners Also Helps Taxpayers

But what if there is no conflict between these purposes? What if reducing mortgage balances would help hundreds of thousands of homeowners stay in their homes and at the same time would save money for Fannie and Freddie?  

That is the conclusion of a very recent not-yet public analysis by Fannie and Freddie presented to the FHFA, according to the ProPublica article: “Fannie and Freddie: Slashing Mortgages Is Good Business.”

The new analyses by Freddie and Fannie were done to assess the new financial incentives that the Obama administration announced in late January.  … . The companies now find that reducing principal on troubled mortgages has a “positive net present value” — in other words, that doing it would bring in more money for the companies over the life of the loans than not doing it.

The two companies’ analyses showed that upwards of a quarter million borrowers who owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth could benefit from principal reductions. The companies would take a loss upfront, but over the long run these mortgage modifications would save the companies money because they would lead to lower default rates.

FHFA’s Response

DeMarco is thinking about it. In a statement he said:

“As I have stated previously, FHFA is considering HAMP incentives for principal reduction and we have been having discussions with [Freddie and Fannie] and Treasury regarding our analysis.”

But he also stated:

“FHFA’s previously released analysis concluded that principal forgiveness did not provide benefits that were greater than principal forbearance as a loss mitigation tool. FHFA’s assessment of the investor incentives now being offered will follow the previous evaluation, including consideration of the eligible universe, operational costs to implement such changes, and potential borrower incentive effects.”

DeMarco seems to be saying that this new analysis may well not change their policy. Why not? After looking at all their options (“the eligible universe”), and considering how borrowers would react to principal reductions (“incentive effects”), it seems to come down to “operational costs”—changes to their accounting and computer systems—which could outweigh the other benefits. It just might be too hard to change Fannie and Freddie’s operations so that principal reductions would work for them.

The Bigger Picture      

So is the FHFA so institutionally ingrained with the short-term profit motive that it would reject Fannie and Freddie’s own conclusions about principal reductions being good for their long term financial health? Does it have SO little ability to adapt? Does the FHFA have such tunnel vision that it can’t give any consideration to the potential benefits to the national housing market, where home values STILL continue to slide? And where in DeMarco’s comments is there any hint whatsoever of compassion for the millions of Americans—about half of them under his control—at continued risk of losing their homes?

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A New Alternative to Foreclosure: Mortgage to Lease

Bank of America is starting a pilot program that will allow homeowners at risk of foreclosure to stay in their homes. Essentially, it entails handing over the deed to the house to the bank and signing a lease that will allow them to rent the house back from the bank at a market rate. Borrowers will agree to a “deed in lieu” of foreclosure, which is less costly to the bank and damages the borrower’s credit less than a foreclosure. Former owners will be offered a one year lease with options to renew every two years at or below the current market price.

The initial breadth of the program has been released to 1,000 homeowners in Arizona, Nevada, and New York-and only homeowners who receive letters from the bank can participate. It is unclear yet how widespread the program will become.  Some have suggested a deterrent may be the need for the bank to comply fully with the Oregon and Washington landlord-tenant act in becoming a  landlord, which includes an obligation to maintain the habitability of the housing unit.  Are banks really ready to become landlords?  My guess is, not really.

For the full story, please visit: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304724404577297904070547784.html?mod=WSJ_myyahoo_module

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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Putting “Profits Before People”?

Now that Fannie and Freddie are essentially owned by the taxpayers, why aren’t these institutions doing more to help homeowners? Particularly, why are they so adamantly against allowing mortgage principal reductions?

These are questions that ProPublica, “an independent, non-profit newsroom that produces investigative journalism in the public interest,” has been following and reporting on in a recent series of articles. I’m highlighting two of those articles in this blog.

Inherently Conflicting Purposes

“Why Fannie and Freddie Are Hesitating to Help Homeowners” describes “Fannie and Freddie’s role in the housing market, and why it seems as if their actions often go against the interests of homeowners.” At the heart of it, these two institutions operate within a conflict about their core purpose: they were set up to make home ownership more accessible, but they are also supposed to make a profit. This first purpose would encourage Fannie and Freddie to be as flexible as possible to allow distressed homeowners to keep their homes. But the profit-making purpose would seem to run counter to letting homeowners too easily get out of their mortgage commitments.

Tax-Payer Takeover Only Complicated the Conflict

Now that taxpayers stand to gain or lose many billions of dollars depending on the profitability of Freddie and Fannie, that would seem to put more emphasis on profit-making and less on homeowner relief. On the other hand, providing significantly more help for distressed homeowners would arguably help stabilize home prices and improve the economy to everyone’s benefit.

As the ProPublica article states:

The two aims of Fannie and Freddie are continually at odds — policies encouraging refinancing and forgiveness for more mortgage holders can increase costs to the taxpayer-owned companies. While the administration has made relief for homeowners their priority, [Edward] DeMarco [the acting head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which oversees Fannie and Freddie] says his agency’s priority is to protect Fannie and Freddie’s profits, aka taxpayers’ assets. Of course, many of those taxpayers are struggling homeowners, and that is at the heart of the dilemma over Fannie and Freddie’s future.

Mortgage Principal Reduction Caught between the Conflicting Purposes

A second ProPublica article addresses whether Fannie and Freddie will allow some homeowners to reduce their mortgage principal balances. That decision hangs in the political balance because of this same conflict between profitability and helping homeowners:

The Obama administration has repeatedly tried to push principal reduction — reducing the size of a borrower’s mortgage — as a way to help homeowners, especially those with homes worth less than their mortgages. But… time and again, Fannie and Freddie wouldn’t participate: a crippling problem, since the two companies own or guarantee about half of the country’s mortgages.

[Edward] DeMarco [the interim head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), says principal reduction could cost taxpayers $100 billion. Some economists counter that while principal reductions might lead to a short-term hit for Fannie and Freddie, it would ultimately result in fewer underwater mortgages, fewer foreclosures and a healthier housing market — all good for Fannie and Freddie’s bottom line.

To give DeMarco the last word, until my next blog:

DeMarco has… [told] Congress many times that “as conservator, FHFA has a statutory responsibility to preserve and conserve the enterprises’ assets.” In plainer terms, he [states] that his role is to “make sure Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac undertake activities that don’t cause further losses for the American taxpayers.”

DeMarco has strongly asserted his independence insisting that he is promoting needed fiscal discipline.

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Foreclosures to Increase in Upcoming Months

Although we have seen a decline in foreclosures in recent months, there will be a turn for the worse for delinquent homeowners in upcoming months. This is due to the $26 billion settlement between the five big banks and state attorneys general over past foreclosure practices, which will enable banks to accelerate the foreclosure process.

These are the foreclosure stats: There were 69,000 completed foreclosures in January 2012, compared to 80,000 in January 2011, and 65,000 in December 2011. The number of completed foreclosures for the previous twelve months was 860,128. From the start of the financial crisis in September 2008, there have been approximately 3.3 million completed foreclosures.

Part of the slowdown has been due to borrowers fighting back against allegedly unlawful maneuvers by the banks and other abuses of foreclosure process.  Now that the way has been cleared for them to resume without threat of continued actions by attorney generals, the pace of actions will likely increase.  It is important to note, however, the settlement does not in any way prevent private parties from suing lenders and others who engage in wrongful or unlawful practices against them.

More info can be found here: http://www.thenichereport.com/breaking-news-2/foreclosures-decline-year-over-year-set-to-heat-back-up-with-huge-mortgage-settlement/

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Study Shows Chapter 7 Debtors Represented by an Attorney Are “Almost Ten Times More Likely to Receive a Discharge” of their Debts

My own professional experience about the dangers of filing bankruptcy without an attorney is validated by carefully analyzed data.

In my work as a bankruptcy attorney, I spend a fair amount of my time attending Chapter 7 “341 hearings” with my clients. That’s the usually straightforward 10-minute or so meeting with the bankruptcy trustee that everyone filing bankruptcy gets to go through a month or so after their case is filed. As I wait for my clients’ turn and listen to other hearings, I see the bad things that happen there to people who file bankruptcy without an attorney. I won’t go through a litany of horror stories here, but let me just say I’ve seen countless examples proving how dangerous it is to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy without an attorney. Besides, I know how complicated bankruptcy laws and procedures are because that’s what I deal with day in and day out. Yet, I’ve always wondered: in actual fact, beyond my own professional knowledge and experience, how much more dangerous is it going without an attorney?

This question is addressed, among many others about the current state of bankruptcy, by a book that was published just a few weeks ago, Broke: How Debt Bankrupts the Middle Class. A compilation of articles by respected scholars, one of the chapters focuses on “pro se” filers (those without attorneys). The author of this chapter, Asst. Professor Angela K. Littwin of the University of Texas School of Law, analyzed data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, “the leading [ongoing] national study of consumer bankruptcy for nearly 30 years.” She concluded “that pro se filers were significantly more likely to have their cases dismissed than their represented counterparts.”

I haven’t yet gotten my hands on that book for the statistical details there, but in another closely related study from last year, Prof. Littwin concluded that “17.6 percent of unrepresented debtors had their cases dismissed or converted” to Chapter 13, [while] only 1.9 percent of debtors with lawyers met this fate.”  Even after controlling for other factors such as “education, race and ethnicity, income, age, homeownership, prior bankruptcy, whether the debtor had any nonminimal unencumbered assets at the time of the filing,” “represented debtors were almost ten times more likely to receive a discharge than their pro se counterparts.”

In her carefully understated and scholarly appropriate way, Prof. Littwin concluded that “there may always be additional unobservable factors for which I cannot control… [b]ut this analysis suggests that filing pro se dramatically escalates the chance that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy will not provide a person with debt relief.”

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How Quickly Will Bankruptcy Stop My Wage Garnishment?

Wage garnishments are stopped instantaneously… except that different state laws and procedures can effect what happens to the current paycheck.

Bankruptcy is a federal proceeding governed by federal law, but state law often plays into it as well. This question about stopping wage garnishments is a good example of the mix of federal and state law.

Except in rare circumstances (mostly involving income taxes and student loans), your wages cannot be garnished for repayment of a consumer debt before the creditor sues you in court and gets a judgment. That lawsuit will almost always be in state court, because the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited. The vast majority of the time debtors do not respond to such lawsuits by the legal deadlines, so the creditors win their judgments by default. Once your creditor has such a state court judgment in hand, it must then follow state law in collecting on it.

But states’ garnishment laws vary widely. Most states permit wage garnishment in some form, but a few restrict it to only very select kinds of debts (like child support, taxes, and/or student loans). Other states which do allow wage garnishment for conventional debts often have special garnishment statutes favoring some of those same select debts. State laws also differ on what part of a paycheck is subject to garnishment compared to the part that is “exempt,” or protected. And laws differ on the details of garnishment procedure, which can become critical as we return to the topic of this blog—how fast a bankruptcy stops a garnishment.

The moment your bankruptcy is filed, the “automatic stay” goes into effect. The filing itself operates as a “stay,” or a stopping, of virtually all collection activity. It operates as an immediate and one-sided court order against creditors, made effective by the very act of filing the bankruptcy case.  So the bankruptcy filing and the automatic stay stops a wage garnishment in its tracks.

But what if the bankruptcy is filed within just a day or two after the money has been taken out of your wages under a state court garnishment order but not yet turned over by your payroll office to the creditor? What does the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay require here when it says that the bankruptcy filing stops “the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case”? (Section 362 (a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.)  Money that was taken out of your paycheck before your bankruptcy case was filed is not “property of the estate,” which consists of all your assets as of when your case is filed. But arguably it’s not your money either as of the time when your case is filed because it was already legitimately taken from you by the garnishment order. So can the creditor get that money that your employer is holding, or would that be a violation of the automatic stay?  

Because different state laws may have different answers to the question of who owns money that has been garnished from your wages but not yet forwarded to the creditor, whether the automatic stay prevents that money from going to the creditor can turn on those different state laws.

Overall, reputable creditors tend to be cautious about violating the automatic stay, and so will usually err on the side of caution to prevent doing so. But other creditors may be more willing to be aggressive, especially if the state’s statutes and/or courts have given them some cover to do so.

The bottom line is that your experienced bankruptcy attorney will be able to tell you two things:

1) what the interplay between the bankruptcy code’s automatic stay and your state’s garnishment law means for a particular paycheck of yours; and

2) whether your specific garnishing creditor tends to be cautious or aggressive about garnishments stopped by bankruptcy.

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The Bankruptcy Consequences of the National Mortgage Settlement

The bankruptcy world played a quiet but significant role in bringing about this controversial $26 billion settlement. So, fittingly, the settlement terms require the banks to make significant changes in their behavior in bankruptcy court.

Before leaving my current series of blogs on this mortgage settlement, I had to tell you about its bankruptcy angles.

The bankruptcy courts are where some of the earliest signs of bank misconduct appeared. For many years before the “robo-signing” scandal broke in the fall of 20010, mortgage lenders had been making a bad name for themselves in bankruptcy court with shoddy accounting and loose paperwork. Unlike most foreclosures—judicial or non-judicial—in which homeowners do not have attorneys representing them, the majority of homeowners in bankruptcy do have attorneys. So when, for example, mortgage lenders try to get “relief from stay”–permission to foreclose on a home under bankruptcy protection—the homeowner has both a convenient forum—the bankruptcy court—and an advocate who can point out to the court that the lender has not credited all the payments, that it has misplaced payments in some “suspense account,” and/or that it hasn’t even provided its own attorney with accurate accounting information or documentation.  

The bankruptcy system also had another player with a major role, as U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder highlighted when he announced the settlement last month:

The U.S. Trustees Program, which serves as the watchdog of all bankruptcy court operations, was one of the first federal agencies to investigate mortgage servicer abuse of homeowners in financial distress.  As part of their investigation, Trustees reviewed more than 37,000 documents filed by major mortgage servicers in federal bankruptcy court – and took discovery in more than 175 cases across the country. 

Accordingly, the Complaint filed against the banks as part of this settlement documentation includes a major section on “The Banks’ Bankruptcy-Related Misconduct,” listing 15 distinct types of misconduct. (See pages 34-38 of the Complaint.)

And each bank’s Consent Judgment contains a series of requirements related to their bankruptcy procedures. (See the Ally Financial/GMAC Mortgage/Residential Capital ”Consent Judgment” here, along with its exhibits, totaling more than 300 pages. The other banks’ Consent Judgments can be found here.)

Here is an example of some of the requirements, as applicable to the banks’ filing of proofs of claim (“POC”) in bankruptcy court, which they file to establish the nature and amount of a debt:

The lender “shall ensure that each POC is documented by attaching:

a. The original or a duplicate of the note, including all indorsements; a copy of any mortgage or deed of trust securing the notes (including, if applicable, evidence of recordation in the applicable land records); and copies of any assignments of mortgage or deed of trust required to demonstrate the right to foreclose on the borrower’s note under applicable state law  … .

….

f. The POC shall be signed (either by hand or by appropriate electronic signature) by the responsible person under penalty of perjury after reasonable investigation, stating that the information set forth in the POC is true and correct to the best of such responsible person’s knowledge, information, and reasonable belief, and clearly identify the responsible person’s employer and position or title with the employer.”

These requirements strike at the rampant problems with insufficient documentation and authorization, including assignments and recordings.  There are similar rules applicable to motions for relief from stay, about fees charged by lenders during Chapter 13 cases, and their loss mitigation behavior during bankruptcy.

Remember that this national mortgage settlement does NOT settle or waive any “claims and defenses asserted by third parties, including individual mortgage loan borrowers on an individual or class basis.” (See the Federal Release, Exhibit F, p. 42, and the State Release, Exhibit G, p. 10, in the Ally Financial “Consent Judgment,” by way of example.) In effect that means that debtors in bankruptcy are not limited by the settlement from pursuing mortgage lenders for their violations of bankruptcy law, including those laws referred to in this settlement. These lenders simply also have their feet to the fire for the next three and a half years while the settlement is in effect and they are being monitored for compliance with its requirements.

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National Mortgage Settlement to Hand Out Cash to Foreclosed-Out Homeowners

Most of the $26 billion or so in this national settlement is designed to help current homeowners keep their homes. But $1.5 billion of it will go to about 750,000 who have already lost their homes to foreclosure. That’s about $2,000 each.

Who’s included?

  • The entire settlement—including this foreclosure cash restitution payment—applies only to mortgages held by the five biggest home mortgage holders and their subsidiaries: Bank of America, Wells Fargo, J.P. Morgan Chase, Ally Financial/GMAC and Citi. To contact these banks to find out if your mortgage is included, go to the special website for this settlement for their toll-free phone numbers and websites. (See the right column, under “Settlement Parties.”)
  • Your home must have been “finally sold or taken in foreclosure between and including January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2011.”
  • One state–Oklahoma—did not join in this settlement, so foreclosed homeowners in Oklahoma are not eligible for this payment.

 What are the conditions for receiving the money?

  • Although one section of the settlement website states that there’s “no requirement to prove financial harm,” the Executive Summary on the same website adds that eligible borrowers are those “who were not properly offered loss mitigation or who were otherwise improperly foreclosed on.” Sounds like some showing of improper servicing or foreclosure behavior by the bank will be required, without a need to prove that this behavior necessarily caused you financial harm. But exactly what information or evidence will be required is not clear yet.  
  • What is clear is that former homeowners will not need to release any potential claims against their mortgage holder in order to receive the money. The payment received would, however, be credited as an offset against any such other claim against the bank.

What’s the procedure and timetable?

  • Within about 90 days, a Settlement Administrator will be selected “to administer the distribution of cash to individual borrowers.”
  • Over the following six to nine months, that Administrator will work with the banks to identify the eligible former homeowners, and send out letters to them to apply for the payment.
  • If you are concerned about the Administrator having your current address, you should contact your Attorney General’s Office to have it send your address to the Administrator.
  • The amount to be distributed to each foreclosed homeowner will depend on how many people qualify and apply. And since the $1.5 billion or so pool of money paid by the banks towards these for payments also pays for “all the costs and expenses of the Administrator,” that reduces what will be available for the homeowners. (The actual amount of the pool, by the way, is actually exactly $1,489,813,925.00—I do not know the reason for that odd amount!).
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