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What qualifies you to receive the $1,500 to $2,000 restitution payment for losing your home to foreclosure? More clues have just become available.

 The “largest consumer financial protection settlement in US history,” the $26 billion national mortgage fraud settlement, was announced with great fanfare in February. More than a month later, on March 12, 2012, the details of the settlement were finalized and hundreds of pages of settlement documents were signed and finally made public. But all those pages still did not at all make clear how a person whose home was foreclosed will qualify to get the money.

To remind you about this, most of the money in this settlement is earmarked for current homeowners for loan modifications, refinances, and other ways to help them hold on to their homes. But just shy of $1.5 billion is for those who’ve already had their homes foreclosed. That’s the subject of this blog.

This part of the settlement applies only to:

  • foreclosures that occurred during the calendar years 2008 through 2011
  • mortgages held or serviced by Bank of America, Wells Fargo, J.P. Morgan Chase, Ally Financial/GMAC and CitiGroup and their affiliates
  • mortgages on which at least 3 payments were made and the property “was not abandoned by the homeowner or condemned prior to the time of the foreclosure sale” 
  • “owner-occupied, one-to-four unit” residence in all states except for Oklahoma, which is not participating in this settlement

Find out if your mortgage is included in this settlement pool by going to the special settlement website for the banks’ toll-free phone numbers and websites.

But once you are in this pool, what further conditions, must you meet to get the money? The initial settlement documents last month surprisingly did not make this clear. They just stated that “cash payments” from the $1.5 billion fund would be provided to borrowers whose homes were foreclosed during the 2008 through 2011 period and “who submit claims arising from the Covered Conduct [the alleged mortgage servicing and foreclosure fraud]; and who otherwise meet criteria set forth by the State members of the Monitoring Committee.”

So if you are a foreclosed homeowner, do you only get the settlement money if you can show your foreclosure happened because of your bank’s alleged misconduct? Has the “Monitoring Committee” provided any more information on this or any other criteria to be used?

Two and a half months after the February 9 announcement of the settlement, there is still no definite answer to the first question. And the second question? The 14 state attorneys general on the “Monitoring Committee” has curiously not directly told foreclosed homeowners anything more about the qualifying criteria, apparently because that will be the job of the “Settlement Administrator.” But in the last few days this Committee HAS indirectly provided some important clues about the criteria through its release of two documents:

The RFP states the following:

Borrower Certifications:

In addition to the baseline eligibility criteria listed above, eligible claimants must also complete a claim certification form in which they certify under penalty of perjury to the following:

  • Borrower lost the home to foreclosure while attempting to save the home through a loan modification or other loss mitigation effort.
  • Servicer errors or misconduct in the loss mitigation or foreclosure processes affected the borrower’s ability to save the home.

But those two requirements are not clear either. What would be considered an adequate attempt by the borrower to save the home? For example, if you simply made a number of unsuccessful attempts to get the lender to respond to phone messages—would that be enough? And how are you going to know when a bank’s misconduct “affected” your ability to save the home when the bank is providing you that kind of information and not admitting anything? Indeed, in this entire multi-billion dollar settlement the banks are not admitting to a single act of misconduct!

The First Addendum—released just a few days ago on April 20—gives some further clues, albeit maddening ones. Here is a pertinent question from the Addendum and the Monitoring Committee’s response:

Question #12: Will the Settlement Administrator be required to request and review documentary proof from claimants who submit claim certification forms in order to determine eligibility?

Answer: No. Other than reviewing the claim certification forms to ensure that claimants properly made the required certifications, the Settlement Administrator will not be required to request and review documentary proof from claimants in order to determine eligibility.

So to receive the settlement money, it looks like you as a foreclosed homeowner will have to sign a claim form stating under penalty of perjury that the foreclosure occurred in spite of you efforts to save the home, AND the foreclosure occurred because of the bank’s “errors or misconduct”—which you may well have no way of knowing about. But, it looks like you will not need to provide any documentation to verify your statements. It is unclear whether information will be provided by your bank to the Settlement Administrator which might contradict your statements—for example asserting that you did not attempt to contact the bank to try to save the home. And if that occurs, there’s also no indication how such disputed facts would be resolved.

Stay tuned here, and on the settlement website, for answers to these continuing ambiguities.

Under new rules coming on line, HARP is now available for refinances no matter how far your home is underwater. The 125% loan-to-value cap is no more.

The purpose of the Home Affordable Refinance Program has been to enable homeowners who could not otherwise qualify for a refinance do so, thereby getting a lower interest rate and lower monthly payment, making more likely that they could afford to stay in their homes. 

Until this revamped version of HARP, homeowners could not qualify if their existing mortgage was more than 125% of the value of their home. In the new improved version announced way back in October, this condition was eliminated. But it has taken until a few weeks ago for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to release their formal guidelines, update their approval software, and start getting lenders on board.

In this blog I will give you a short list of the main conditions for HARP 2.0 eligibility, and then provide a few good sources for more detailed information.  

Eligibility

1. Your mortgage loan must be owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Why? Because these entities were effectively taken over by the government near the beginning of the real estate market crash, and so the federal government can require them to follow new refinancing rules. HARP operates through Fannie and Freddie, and so loans owned by private lenders aren’t in the program. However, a large majority of home mortgages are held by Fannie or Freddie, so there’s a good chance yours is as well. You can find out by checking these two websites: www.fanniemae.com/loanlookup  or www.freddiemac.com/mymortgage. (If you instead you have a VA, FHA, or USDA home loan, they each have their own refinancing programs.)

2. Your loan must have been sold to Fannie or Freddie on or before May 31, 2009.

3. Your loan was not refinanced through HARP previously. No second bites at this apple. One small exception—if you happened to refinance your Fannie Mae mortgage from March through May of 2009. Also, prior non-HARP refinances are not a problem.

4. Your current loan-to-value must be greater than 80%. Although HARP is not limited to underwater loans, you can’t have more than 20% equity. Presumably, homes with an equity cushion are either more likely to be refinanced on the private market, and any event their owners will be motivated to preserve their equity. The point of HARP is to enable refinances which could not otherwise happen, and to give help and motivation to homeowners who have little or no equity.

5. Must be current on the mortgage—no late payments in the last 6 months, maximum of 1 in the last 12 months. Given that this program will leave the homeowner with a loan with little or no equity, and often with serious negative equity, the borrower must show a very clean recent payment history. However, many other requirements have been loosened, for example automated appraisals will be permitted instead of needing on-site ones (since the home value is not important here), and income verification will be less often required, making self-employed people more likely eligible.

CAUTION: Lenders have a fair amount of discretion to alter these rules, so refer to your lender for the details, and it may well be worth shopping for eligibility and better refinance terms.

Resources for More Information

1.  A good general new story about the HARP changes, from the website edition of the Philadelphia Inquirer.

2. The best detailed description I could find of the new program, in a website called bills.com.

3. Some experts’ opinions about the impact of HARP 2.0 in a Wall Street Journal blog.

4. A HARP 2.0 eligibility calculator on Zillow.com.

With nearly 3 million homes lost to foreclosure and an expected additional 10 million homes in the near future, what is a troubled homeowner to do?

In February 2012, the National Consumer Law Center published its fourth report on foreclosure mediation .

They found that:

  • Foreclosure mediation programs and conferences provide substantial community benefits at little or no cost. Mediation fees average from none to less than $1,000. Yet, investors lost an average $145,000 per home foreclosure in 2008, and foreclosures just in California have resulted in nearly $500 billion in aggregate costs.

 

  • Effective mediation programs do not prolong foreclosures.

 

  • Foreclosure mediation programs should connect borrowers with housing counselors. Borrowers who receive housing counseling are much more likely to avoid foreclosure, and obtain affordable as well as sustainable loan modifications.

 

  • Not all foreclosure mediation programs are equal. All states should adopt foreclosure mediation programs with enforceable standards and robust outreach as permanent features of state foreclosure laws as quickly as possible.

 

  • Mediation programs must ensure that the FHFA’s new servicing guidelines do not lead to unnecessary foreclosures.

 

  • Strong foreclosure mediation programs can work hand-in-hand with other tools to rebuild the nation’s broken mortgage market and should be used to maximize HAMP modifications. The modified loans’ default rate over 1 year dropped from 56.2% in 2008 to 25.7% in 2010. HAMP loan modifications were the most sustainable of all with a 17.3% (2011) redefault rate after 1 year.

 

  • Policymakers can use mediation programs to help preserve minority homeownership; gains made over the last decade are vanishing.

 

Borrowers in mediation must receive accurate information about an increasingly unaffordable rental market. Renters, especially those who are low-income, are more than twice as likely as homeowners to spend more than 50% of income for housing. Mediation programs should refer all homeowners to housing counselors to evaluate the costs of renting before giving up on saving a home.

Powerful Chapter 13 gives you tools to solve your mortgage problems from a number of different angles.  Plus it gives you other tools to deal with tax, support, and judgment liens on your home.

In my last blog I showed how a straight Chapter 7 bankruptcy case can sometimes help you enough to save your home. Or at least it can help you hold onto your home for as long as you need to.  But Chapter 7 can only give limited help, sufficient only in limited circumstances. Chapter 13, on the other hand, provides you a much more powerful and flexible package, with a range of tools for addressing just about all debt issues involving your home.

Here are the first five of ten distinct and significant ways that Chapter 13 can save your home. I’ll give you the other five in my next blog.

A Chapter 13 case enables you:

1. … to stretch out the amount of time you get for catching up on missed mortgage payments, giving you as long as 5 years to do so. A longer repayment period means that you can pay less each month, making it more likely that you will actually be able to catch up and keep your home. Throughout this catch-up period, you are protected from foreclosure as long as you stay with the payment program, one that you propose.

2. … to slash your other debt obligations so that you can afford your mortgage payments. The mortgage debt—especially your first mortgage—is highly favored within Chapter 13. So you are usually allowed—indeed required—to pay most of your mortgage payments in full, while being allowed to pay only as much as you have left over towards your “general unsecured” debts—those without any collateral, such as most credit cards, medical debts, and many other types of debts.

3. … to permanently prevent income tax liens, child and spousal support liens, and judgment liens from attaching to your home. This stops these special creditors from gaining dangerous leverage over you and your home.

4. … to have the time to pay debts that cannot be discharged (legally written off) in bankruptcy, all the while being protected from those creditors messing with your home. That applies when the tax, support or other lien was not filed before the Chapter 13 is filed—the example immediately above. But this also applies if the lien is already in place, giving you the opportunity to pay the debt while under the protection of the bankruptcy laws, undercutting most of the leverage of those liens against your home. And at the end of your case, the debts are paid and those liens are gone.

5. … to discharge debts owed to creditors which could otherwise attack your home.
For example, certain income tax debts are discharged, leaving you owing nothing. But if instead you had not filed the Chapter 13 case, or delayed doing so, a tax lien could have been recorded on that tax debt. That would have required you to pay some or all of the balance to free your home from that lien. Even most conventional debts can turn into judgment liens against your house after a lawsuit is filed. And certain judgment liens may or may not be able to be taken care of in bankruptcy.  If instead you file a Chapter 13 case to prevent these liens from happening, at the end of your case the debt is gone, and no such liens ever attach to your home.

Again, see my next blog for the other five house-saving tools of Chapter 13.

When does filing a Chapter 7 “straight bankruptcy” case help you enough so that you don’t need a 3-to-5-year Chapter 13 case?

If you are behind on your mortgage payments but want to keep your home, you have likely heard that a Chapter 13 “payment plan” is what you need. And that IS a powerful package, with an impressive set of tools to deal with a wide variety of home-related problems—everything from the mortgages themselves to property taxes, income tax liens, and judgment liens.

But what if you need to discharge other debts to get a fresh financial start, and have managed to fall only a couple of months behind on your mortgage? Or what if you are not keeping the house, but just need a little more time to find another place to live?

Then you may well not need a Chapter 13 case, and can maybe avoid the disadvantages it comes with—mostly, that it takes so much longer and generally costs lots more than Chapter 7. This extra time and cost can be well worthwhile when you need the great advantages of Chapter 13, but let’s look at ways that Chapter 7 can do enough for your home:

In a Chapter 7 case:

1. The “automatic stay”—the bankruptcy provision that stops virtually all actions by creditors against you or your property—applies to Chapter 7 just as it does to Chapter 13. So the filing of a Chapter 7 case STOPS a foreclosure in its tracks, just as quickly as a Chapter 13 filing. But if you are just trying to buy time to save money for a rental, the tough question is HOW LONG that break in the mortgage company’s foreclosure efforts will last, and how much extra time it’ll buy you. An aggressive creditor could quickly ask the court for “relief from the stay”—permission to resume the foreclosure process—thus potentially getting you only a few extra weeks. Or on the other extreme, a mortgage creditor could just do nothing for the 3 months or so until your Chapter 7 case runs its course and the “automatic stay” expires with the completion of your case. So, Chapter 7 often does not come with much predictability about how much time you’d gain. On the other hand, your bankruptcy attorney may well have experience in how fast certain mortgage lenders tend to ask for “relief from stay” under facts similar to yours.

2. Chapter 7 stops—at least briefly—not only mortgage foreclosures, but also prevents other potential liens from being placed against your house, including the IRS’s tax liens and judgment liens. But why would the few weeks or months that Chapter 7 gains make any difference with these kinds of creditors? In the right set of facts, it can make many thousands of dollars of difference.

• A timely filing of a Chapter 7 case can prevent you from having to pay a debt that would otherwise have become a lien against your house. For example, let’s say you have an older IRS debt that meets the necessary conditions for discharge, and you also have a little equity in your home but not more than your homestead exemption allows. If you waited until after the IRS recorded a tax lien for that debt against your house, that lien would continue being attached to your house even if you filed a bankruptcy and would eventually have to be paid. However, if your Chapter 7 filing happened before the IRS recorded a tax lien, the “automatic stay” would prevent that tax lien from being filed, the tax debt would be discharged forever, and your home’s equity would be preserved.

• Or if instead let’s say you have a debt that is NOT going to be discharged in bankruptcy—say a more recent tax debt—but you also had some assets that you were going to have to surrender to the Chapter 7 trustee, what we call an “asset case.” If again you filed the bankruptcy case before the recording of the tax lien, your Chapter 7 trustee could well pay those taxes as a “priority” debt in front of any of your other debts, potentially leaving you with no tax debt at the completion of your case.

3. Chapter 7 allows you to concentrate on your house payments by getting rid of your other debts. If you’ve managed to keep current on those mortgage payments, but don’t know how long you will be able to do so, the relief you get from discharging your other debts greatly improves your odds of staying current on your home long term. Or if you have missed only a few mortgage payments, AND can reliably make future ones, PLUS enough to catch up on your arrearage within year or less, then Chapter 7 would like very likely do enough for you. Most mortgage creditors will let you enter into an agreement –often called a “forbearance agreement”—to catch up the missed payments by paying a sufficient specific amount extra each month until you’re caught up, again, as long as that period of catch-up time is relatively short. Otherwise, you may well need a Chapter 13.

 

A short sale of your home is sometimes your best alternative. But short sales often do not successfully close, and even when they do you must be vigilant to avoid problems later.

In a short sale, a house is sold by “shorting”—underpaying—one or more of the lenders (or “lienholders”), because the value of the house, and thus the purchase price offered by the reasonable buyer, is not enough to pay everyone in full. The liens can include not just voluntary ones such as the first and second mortgage, but also judgments, income taxes, support obligations, unpaid utilities, and property taxes. All lienholders must consent and release their liens, or the sale cannot occur, because the title needs to be clear for the new buyer to be in full ownership.

The important thing to know is that unless you get a full settlement or satisfaction in writing you may face continuing liability to any creditor who was not paid in full, even after the sale!  This is why it is important to work with competent and knowledgeable professionals in dealing with any short sale situation.

The primary benefit of a short sale is that it avoids a foreclosure on the homeowner’s credit record—that is, it does so IF the short sale is successful. Generally, the most common current underwriting criteria will prevent a borrower from qualifying for a new home loan for up to 7 years after a foreclosure, but only 2-4 years after a short sale.  (However, given the present economic climate, in the future there may be less credit record difference between a short sale and a foreclosure.)  This credit record difference is often the primary reason borrowers will try to do a short sale, instead of just letting a property go to foreclosure.

Short sales can have problems, however.

First, they can be much harder to pull off than expected, and can take much longer than expected. It is also possible they fail to close, typically due to servicer/lender rejection of reasonable purchase offers, which can be very frustrating to all parties involved.  Short sales may also fail due to:

  • Lack of incentive of the Servicer:  Many mortgage companies are not well organized or staffed to handle short sale negotiations.  Borrowers and agents generally must work through a servicing company, whose financial incentives may well not encourage short sales. So they may drag their heels, and can even sabotage your efforts, even after months of submitting documents and reasonable offers.  This causes many would-be buyers to get frustrated and walk away from the deal rather than keep trying in the face of such adversity and frustration.  LAck of responsiveness of servicers is a major cause of short sale failures.
  • Since all lienholders must agree, any one of them can kill the deal: To accomplish a short sale, usually the first mortgage holder has to give up some money to a junior lienholder or two. The benefit to the first mortgage holder is that getting a little less out of the sale is better than incurring the substantial costs and delay of foreclosure.  However, they may not be willing to allow enough money to a junior to entice all parties to allow the short sale to be completed.  Everybody wants their “fair share” of a pie that is too small to make everybody happy.  So just when you think you have a deal among the main players , someone else crawls out of the woodwork demanding a payment and jeopardizing the closing. They all have a legal claim against the property, and can delay or undo the whole deal.
  • Closing and other costs can be too high: Sometimes after adding up all the closing costs and realtor fees, there may not be a high enough “net proceed” number to entice the lender to do the deal.  Of course, the realtors and their negotiating agents are doing a lion’s share of the work in any short sale process, and must be adequately compensated by the lender at closing.  This is how a short sale can be done with little or no out-of-pocket cost to the borrower.  Sometimes the banks have a hard time with this concept and will lead to a sale failure by their rejection of reasonable market offers.  This just means they will actually lose more money in the long run, and it is frustrating for everyone involved, particularly the realtors and others who put substantial time and efforts into the process only to have it fail due to a recalcitrant or incompetent servicing agent.

Short sales can be dangerous if you are not well-informed:

  • Potential liability from unpaid balances on the junior mortgages and liens: Although you may be told that you will not be liable, you need to be sure that the acceptance and/or settlement documents and the applicable law in fact cut off any financial liability to you following the sale. Also be aware that sometimes in the midst of the negotiations, especially if a junior lienholder is playing tough, and the closing has been delayed for a long time, you may be feel forced to accept some liability in order for the closing to occur.  This may or may not be in your best interest, and you may wish to consult with an attorney to discuss all the factors and options – be sure to consult with someone who is unbiased and who will advise as to your interests alone (unlike realtor or others who may only get paid upon sale).
  • Potential tax consequences: This issue deserves a whole blog by itself. The key principle is that debt forgiveness can be treated as income subject to taxation unless you fit within one of the exceptions. Make sure you talk with an appropriate tax specialist or attorney about this before investing any time or expectations in the short sale option.  Most residential borrowers will have an exception, but not always!

Will Fannie and Freddie finally be making mortgage principal reductions now that their own analysis shows that doing so would benefit their own financial health—and make them better able to repay billions owed to U.S. taxpayers?

My last blog described Fannie and Freddie’s conflicting purposes: to make home ownership more accessible, but to do so profitably for themselves. And I showed how this inherent conflict has led to a political dispute between the Obama Administration on one side pushing for greater flexibility in helping distressed homeowners keep their homes—and specifically to allow principal reductions, while on the other side Edward DeMarco, the acting director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and Fannie and Freddie’s overseer, disallowing principal reductions in order “to preserve and conserve [Fannie and Freddie’s] assets.”

Helping Homeowners Also Helps Taxpayers

But what if there is no conflict between these purposes? What if reducing mortgage balances would help hundreds of thousands of homeowners stay in their homes and at the same time would save money for Fannie and Freddie?  

That is the conclusion of a very recent not-yet public analysis by Fannie and Freddie presented to the FHFA, according to the ProPublica article: “Fannie and Freddie: Slashing Mortgages Is Good Business.”

The new analyses by Freddie and Fannie were done to assess the new financial incentives that the Obama administration announced in late January.  … . The companies now find that reducing principal on troubled mortgages has a “positive net present value” — in other words, that doing it would bring in more money for the companies over the life of the loans than not doing it.

The two companies’ analyses showed that upwards of a quarter million borrowers who owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth could benefit from principal reductions. The companies would take a loss upfront, but over the long run these mortgage modifications would save the companies money because they would lead to lower default rates.

FHFA’s Response

DeMarco is thinking about it. In a statement he said:

“As I have stated previously, FHFA is considering HAMP incentives for principal reduction and we have been having discussions with [Freddie and Fannie] and Treasury regarding our analysis.”

But he also stated:

“FHFA’s previously released analysis concluded that principal forgiveness did not provide benefits that were greater than principal forbearance as a loss mitigation tool. FHFA’s assessment of the investor incentives now being offered will follow the previous evaluation, including consideration of the eligible universe, operational costs to implement such changes, and potential borrower incentive effects.”

DeMarco seems to be saying that this new analysis may well not change their policy. Why not? After looking at all their options (“the eligible universe”), and considering how borrowers would react to principal reductions (“incentive effects”), it seems to come down to “operational costs”—changes to their accounting and computer systems—which could outweigh the other benefits. It just might be too hard to change Fannie and Freddie’s operations so that principal reductions would work for them.

The Bigger Picture      

So is the FHFA so institutionally ingrained with the short-term profit motive that it would reject Fannie and Freddie’s own conclusions about principal reductions being good for their long term financial health? Does it have SO little ability to adapt? Does the FHFA have such tunnel vision that it can’t give any consideration to the potential benefits to the national housing market, where home values STILL continue to slide? And where in DeMarco’s comments is there any hint whatsoever of compassion for the millions of Americans—about half of them under his control—at continued risk of losing their homes?

Bank of America is starting a pilot program that will allow homeowners at risk of foreclosure to stay in their homes. Essentially, it entails handing over the deed to the house to the bank and signing a lease that will allow them to rent the house back from the bank at a market rate. Borrowers will agree to a “deed in lieu” of foreclosure, which is less costly to the bank and damages the borrower’s credit less than a foreclosure. Former owners will be offered a one year lease with options to renew every two years at or below the current market price.

The initial breadth of the program has been released to 1,000 homeowners in Arizona, Nevada, and New York-and only homeowners who receive letters from the bank can participate. It is unclear yet how widespread the program will become.  Some have suggested a deterrent may be the need for the bank to comply fully with the Oregon and Washington landlord-tenant act in becoming a  landlord, which includes an obligation to maintain the habitability of the housing unit.  Are banks really ready to become landlords?  My guess is, not really.

For the full story, please visit: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304724404577297904070547784.html?mod=WSJ_myyahoo_module

Now that Fannie and Freddie are essentially owned by the taxpayers, why aren’t these institutions doing more to help homeowners? Particularly, why are they so adamantly against allowing mortgage principal reductions?

These are questions that ProPublica, “an independent, non-profit newsroom that produces investigative journalism in the public interest,” has been following and reporting on in a recent series of articles. I’m highlighting two of those articles in this blog.

Inherently Conflicting Purposes

Why Fannie and Freddie Are Hesitating to Help Homeowners” describes “Fannie and Freddie’s role in the housing market, and why it seems as if their actions often go against the interests of homeowners.” At the heart of it, these two institutions operate within a conflict about their core purpose: they were set up to make home ownership more accessible, but they are also supposed to make a profit. This first purpose would encourage Fannie and Freddie to be as flexible as possible to allow distressed homeowners to keep their homes. But the profit-making purpose would seem to run counter to letting homeowners too easily get out of their mortgage commitments.

Tax-Payer Takeover Only Complicated the Conflict

Now that taxpayers stand to gain or lose many billions of dollars depending on the profitability of Freddie and Fannie, that would seem to put more emphasis on profit-making and less on homeowner relief. On the other hand, providing significantly more help for distressed homeowners would arguably help stabilize home prices and improve the economy to everyone’s benefit.

As the ProPublica article states:

The two aims of Fannie and Freddie are continually at odds — policies encouraging refinancing and forgiveness for more mortgage holders can increase costs to the taxpayer-owned companies. While the administration has made relief for homeowners their priority, [Edward] DeMarco [the acting head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which oversees Fannie and Freddie] says his agency’s priority is to protect Fannie and Freddie’s profits, aka taxpayers’ assets. Of course, many of those taxpayers are struggling homeowners, and that is at the heart of the dilemma over Fannie and Freddie’s future.

Mortgage Principal Reduction Caught between the Conflicting Purposes

A second ProPublica article addresses whether Fannie and Freddie will allow some homeowners to reduce their mortgage principal balances. That decision hangs in the political balance because of this same conflict between profitability and helping homeowners:

The Obama administration has repeatedly tried to push principal reduction — reducing the size of a borrower’s mortgage — as a way to help homeowners, especially those with homes worth less than their mortgages. But… time and again, Fannie and Freddie wouldn’t participate: a crippling problem, since the two companies own or guarantee about half of the country’s mortgages.

[Edward] DeMarco [the interim head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), says principal reduction could cost taxpayers $100 billion. Some economists counter that while principal reductions might lead to a short-term hit for Fannie and Freddie, it would ultimately result in fewer underwater mortgages, fewer foreclosures and a healthier housing market — all good for Fannie and Freddie’s bottom line.

To give DeMarco the last word, until my next blog:

DeMarco has… [told] Congress many times that “as conservator, FHFA has a statutory responsibility to preserve and conserve the enterprises’ assets.” In plainer terms, he [states] that his role is to “make sure Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac undertake activities that don’t cause further losses for the American taxpayers.”

DeMarco has strongly asserted his independence insisting that he is promoting needed fiscal discipline.

The bankruptcy world played a quiet but significant role in bringing about this controversial $26 billion settlement. So, fittingly, the settlement terms require the banks to make significant changes in their behavior in bankruptcy court.

Before leaving my current series of blogs on this mortgage settlement, I had to tell you about its bankruptcy angles.

The bankruptcy courts are where some of the earliest signs of bank misconduct appeared. For many years before the “robo-signing” scandal broke in the fall of 20010, mortgage lenders had been making a bad name for themselves in bankruptcy court with shoddy accounting and loose paperwork. Unlike most foreclosures—judicial or non-judicial—in which homeowners do not have attorneys representing them, the majority of homeowners in bankruptcy do have attorneys. So when, for example, mortgage lenders try to get “relief from stay”–permission to foreclose on a home under bankruptcy protection—the homeowner has both a convenient forum—the bankruptcy court—and an advocate who can point out to the court that the lender has not credited all the payments, that it has misplaced payments in some “suspense account,” and/or that it hasn’t even provided its own attorney with accurate accounting information or documentation.  

The bankruptcy system also had another player with a major role, as U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder highlighted when he announced the settlement last month:

The U.S. Trustees Program, which serves as the watchdog of all bankruptcy court operations, was one of the first federal agencies to investigate mortgage servicer abuse of homeowners in financial distress.  As part of their investigation, Trustees reviewed more than 37,000 documents filed by major mortgage servicers in federal bankruptcy court – and took discovery in more than 175 cases across the country. 

Accordingly, the Complaint filed against the banks as part of this settlement documentation includes a major section on “The Banks’ Bankruptcy-Related Misconduct,” listing 15 distinct types of misconduct. (See pages 34-38 of the Complaint.)

And each bank’s Consent Judgment contains a series of requirements related to their bankruptcy procedures. (See the Ally Financial/GMAC Mortgage/Residential Capital ”Consent Judgment” here, along with its exhibits, totaling more than 300 pages. The other banks’ Consent Judgments can be found here.)

Here is an example of some of the requirements, as applicable to the banks’ filing of proofs of claim (“POC”) in bankruptcy court, which they file to establish the nature and amount of a debt:

The lender “shall ensure that each POC is documented by attaching:

a. The original or a duplicate of the note, including all indorsements; a copy of any mortgage or deed of trust securing the notes (including, if applicable, evidence of recordation in the applicable land records); and copies of any assignments of mortgage or deed of trust required to demonstrate the right to foreclose on the borrower’s note under applicable state law  … .

….

f. The POC shall be signed (either by hand or by appropriate electronic signature) by the responsible person under penalty of perjury after reasonable investigation, stating that the information set forth in the POC is true and correct to the best of such responsible person’s knowledge, information, and reasonable belief, and clearly identify the responsible person’s employer and position or title with the employer.”

These requirements strike at the rampant problems with insufficient documentation and authorization, including assignments and recordings.  There are similar rules applicable to motions for relief from stay, about fees charged by lenders during Chapter 13 cases, and their loss mitigation behavior during bankruptcy.

Remember that this national mortgage settlement does NOT settle or waive any “claims and defenses asserted by third parties, including individual mortgage loan borrowers on an individual or class basis.” (See the Federal Release, Exhibit F, p. 42, and the State Release, Exhibit G, p. 10, in the Ally Financial “Consent Judgment,” by way of example.) In effect that means that debtors in bankruptcy are not limited by the settlement from pursuing mortgage lenders for their violations of bankruptcy law, including those laws referred to in this settlement. These lenders simply also have their feet to the fire for the next three and a half years while the settlement is in effect and they are being monitored for compliance with its requirements.